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In March 2018, Sophia Stone and I hosted a 
conference on the possibility of intermediates in 
Plato’s dialogues at Florida Atlantic University 
Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College. The six pa­
pers that follow this introduction were originally 
presented at the conference and were revised for 
inclusion in this volume. In our work, we aimed 
to preserve the “presentation feel” of the papers 
and thus they might not have the same degree of 
notes found in regular journal articles. Although 
taking this approach does come with some schol­
arly costs, we believe it is more important and 
fruitful to preserve the “dialectical aspect” of the 
papers — we are Platonists, after all. 
The problem of intermediates is an expan­
sive philosophical and interpretative issue. 
A proper study of it requires not only under­
standing the Platonic corpus but interpreta­
tions of it by Plato’s students and followers as 
well. The problem begins — to somewhat of a 
surprise — with Aristotle. In Metaphysics Α, 
Aristotle asserts that 
...besides sensible things and Forms he 
[Plato] says there are the objects of math­
ematics, which occupy an intermediate 
position, differing from sensible things 
in being eternal and unchangeable, from 
Forms in that there are many alike, while 
the Form itself is in each case unique. 
(987b14 ­17; see also B.997b12 ­24 and 
M.1076b39 ­1077a9)
Despite Aristotle’s testimony, no place in 
Plato’s corpus do we find an explicit endorse­
ment of intermediate objects. Scholars, thus, 
face a choice: they can either accept the testi­
mony and mine the corpus for places where 
Plato might implicitly endorse such a thesis 
or they can argue that Aristotle was confused 
and that Plato doesn’t think intermediate ob­
jects exist.
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For most of history, students of Plato have 
opted for the former approach. Perhaps the 
most common place scholars have identified 
the intermediate objects described by Aristotle 
is in the Divided Line of the Republic. As we 
know, the line represents a parallel progression 
in both ontology and epistemology. Socrates 
carves up the line into four segments, with each 
corresponding to a unique affection in the soul 
(pathēma en tē psuchē): noēsis (knowledge) for 
the highest condition, dianoia (thought) for 
the second, pistis (belief) for the third, and ei‑
kasia (imagination) for the lowest (6.511d; cf. 
7.533d ­534a). Some scholars have argued that 
based on a principle defended in Book 5, each 
of these affections in the soul must be set over 
a different object. For in Book 5, Socrates dis­
tinguishes knowledge (epistēmē), belief (doxa), 
and ignorance (agnoia) by arguing that different 
cognitive dunameis (faculties/capacities/pow­
ers) are set over different objects (477a ­478c). 
If this principle is accurate and if “affections in 
the soul” are dunameis, then it must be the case 
that dianoia is set over a different object from 
noēsis. Now because pistis (belief) corresponds 
to sensible objects and noēsis (knowledge) cor­
responds to Forms, dianoia must correspond to 
something in between sensible particulars and 
Forms. When we add to this that dianoia deals 
with the intelligible (noēton) and not the vis­
ible (horaton), and is explained by reference to 
mathematics (6.510b ­e), it begins to look plau­
sible that dianoia is set over the mathematical 
intermediate objects described by Aristotle.  
Starting from this position, in, “What are 
the Objects of Dianoia?” Lloyd Gerson seeks 
to explain the distinctiveness of dianoia, both 
in terms of cognition and ontology. Gerson 
argues that it is only in relation to the Form 
of the Good that an explanation can be found. 
Following the tradition of Platonism, Gerson 
argues that we must understand the Form of 
the Good as the One — the only unqualifiedly 
incomposite. Although everything is related to 
the One, it relates to nothing since this would 
make the One complex and thus no longer sim­
ple. The objects of dianoia are the relational 
aspects or expressions of Being cognized in­
dependently of the Good.
However, since the late 19th century scholars 
have begun to challenge the legitimacy of Aris­
totle’s testimony. Several details of the divided 
line raise problems for the “old interpretation”; 
I’ll focus on three. First, the divided line is 
the perfect place for Socrates to discuss inter­
mediate objects, yet he never does; this makes 
it doubtful that he actually had these objects 
in mind. Second, when relating dianoia to the 
methodology of mathematicians, Socrates says 
that although the mathematician uses visible 
images and makes claims about them, they pur­
sue their inquiry for “the square itself” (6.510d). 
This makes it sound like dianoia and noēsis 
deal with the same object. Third, provided that 
Plato actually accepts a principle that different 
dunameis (faculties/capacities/powers) are set 
over different objects, it doesn’t follow that di‑
anoia is set over a different object because it is 
not described as a dunamis but an “affection in 
the soul” (pathēma en tē psuchē). It is true that 
different “faculties” correspond to different 
“affections,” but we cannot infer a difference 
in faculty from a difference in “affection.” Pain 
and pleasure are different affects, but they can 
correspond to the same faculty and object. 
Indeed, in, “Unclarity and the Intermedi­
ates in Plato’s Discussions of Clarity in the Re‑
public,” Nicholas Smith argues that reconciling 
Socrates’ discussion of ontology and epistemol­
ogy in Book 5 with the account of the divided 
line is more problematic than scholars have 
thought. A large source of these problems stems 
from Socrates appearing to alter his descrip­
tion of the line in Book 7 (533e ­534a) from his 
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initial account in Book 6 (509e ­511e). Rather 
than clarifying the details of the Line, positing 
intermediate objects in the third segment only 
obfuscates things.  Such an interpretation can 
neither make sense of the philosophical and 
proportional entailments of the line nor can it 
account for what Socrates says in Book 5 about 
Forms. In Book 5, we learn that epistēmē is set 
over “what is” (477b ­478d) and “what is” is a 
perfect exemplar of whatever it is. The problem 
with mathematical intermediates is that they 
too are supposed to be perfect exemplars; thus, 
they qualify as “what is” by the standards of 
Book 5. In other words, there doesn’t seem to 
be enough room for intermediates based on 
what Plato says in Books 5 ­7.
If this negative interpretation is correct, 
two questions arise. First, if dianoia is always 
oriented towards Forms and not intermediates, 
what is it about the mathematical inf lection 
of dianoia that prevents a clear apprehension 
of Forms? Second, if there is no evidence of 
intermediates in Plato’s corpus, what explains 
Aristotle’s testimony? Andy German’s, “From 
Intermediates through Eidetic Numbers: Plato 
on the Limits of Counting,” makes progress on 
both fronts. German argues that the opacity 
of dianoia results from its inability to grasp 
the inter ­relation of Forms. In developing his 
argument, German draws on Jacob Klein’s 
analysis of eidetic numbers in the Sophist. For 
Klein, the unsatisfactory attempt in the Soph‑
ist to understand the inter ­relation of formal 
kinds on analogy to numbers reveals exactly 
how dianoia cannot grasp the foundations of 
its own activity. German concludes his paper by 
explaining how Plato and Aristotle are speak­
ing about the same thing, but not saying the 
same thing about it. 
Emily Katz explores Aristotle’s testimony 
from the other side of the coin in, “The Mixed 
Mathematical Intermediates.” Katz seeks to ex­
plain why Aristotle thought it was necessary 
that Platonists accept intermediates and what 
this can tell us about Aristotle’s own commit­
ments. Many scholars find Aristotle’s criticism 
of Platonism’s ontology as merely polemical 
(see especially, Metaphysics B.2.997b12 ­24 and 
M.2.1076b39 ­1077a9). Aristotle reasons that 
Platonists must be committed to (1) arithmeti­
cal and geometrical intermediates, and if this is 
so, then they must be committed to (2) interme­
diate sensible things, and if this is so, they must 
be committed to (3) intermediates of all sen­
sible objects. Many feel that Aristotle is piling 
absurdities on Platonists; Katz, however, disa­
grees. Katz argues that Aristotle’s criticism is 
sincere because we find evidence of him voicing 
similar concerns elsewhere. This casts doubt 
on any interpretation of Aristotle’s philoso­
phy of mathematics that makes him fall prey 
to the objections he raises against Platonists.
Sophia Stone’s paper, “Monas and Psuchē 
in the Phaedo,” shifts focus to the Phaedo. 
Stone explores the various meanings of key 
mathematical concepts used by Socrates in 
the dialogues. She argues that a proper under­
standing of these mathematical concepts not 
only makes the final proof more plausible, but 
also demonstrates how there is room in Plato’s 
ontology for the intermediate objects Aristotle 
attributes to him. The key idea is that monas 
(unit) and psuchē (soul) share a dual role: they 
can both exist embodied in sensible particulars 
and apart from them. This dual role is due to 
their ontological status of being in between 
Forms and sensible particulars.
In his, “Thumos and Doxa as Intermediates 
in the Republic,” Olivier Renaut reminds us that 
Plato’s discussion of intermediates isn’t only ap­
plicable to metaphysics — after all, Plato is very 
much a philosopher of intermediates. Across 
varying subjects, ranging from ethics to cos­
mology — and everything in between — Plato 
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seeks to bridge and explain the gap between 
two poles. Renaut aims to explain the relation­
ship between the psychological intermediate, 
thumos (spirit), and the epistemic intermediate, 
doxa (belief), in the Republic. Renaut directs 
our attention to three connections: (1) the ob­
jects of thumos are always doxai, (2) thumos 
gives power to doxa to overcome the appetite, 
and (3) thumos gives doxa relative stability. In 
terms of education, these intermediates are 
mediations that not only give meaning to the 
positive pole but also help direct us to it. 
This volume is not intended to be the final 
word on Plato’s intermediates, much more work 
still needs to be done. I hope that this volume 
not only advances the study of this issue, but 
also redirects focus on it. I thank all the con­
tributors to this volume and participants at the 
conference, the Plato Journal for the opportu­
nity to present this work, and Sophia Stone for 
her help with editing the papers and organizing 
the conference. 
